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We study the relationship between decentralization of R&D, innovation and firm performance using
a novel dataset on the organizational structure of 1,290 American publicly-listed corporations, 2,615
of their affiliate firms, as well as characteristics of 594,903 patents that they hold. We explore the
tension between centralization and decentralization of R&D, which trades off between responsiveness
to immediate and local business needs and the type of research that can benefit the firm as a whole.
To do this, we develop two novel measures of decentralization. First, using intra-firm patent assignments,
we distinguish between patents that are assigned to the inventing unit rather than to corporate headquarters.
Second, we exploit the variation between firms which posses a central corporate R&D labs and those
that do not. We find that centralized R&D tends be more scientific, broader in scope, and have more
technical impact, while being more likely in firms that operate within a narrower range of businesses,
in complex technologies, or that are less reliant upon acquisitions. Additionally, we find that firms
with a more decentralized structure, on average, invest less in R&D, generate fewer patents per R&D,
and exhibit greater sales growth and higher market value. We discuss several theories that can explain
these relationships, as well as potential avenues for future research.
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Why do otherwise similar ﬁrms exhibit markedly diﬀerent organizational structures? Though
central to much theorizing in economics, strategic management, and organization studies,
the internal organization of ﬁrms has received very little large-scale empirical analysis. In
this paper we advance this exploration by analyzing new data that identiﬁes whether an
invention originates from a ﬁrm’s corporate lab, in conjunction with data on the assign-
ment of patent rights within large American ﬁrms, to measure decentralization of R&D
in a ﬁrm. The main contribution of this paper is to document characteristics of research
under diﬀerent organization forms in large American corporations. We show that large
American ﬁrms vary substantially in terms of their internal structure, and show that this
structure has strong implications for innovation, such as R&D investment and patenting
intensity, and for overall ﬁrm performance, such as growth and market value.
R&D is an important function, and there has been considerable empirical and theo-
retical work on the relationship between performance and R&D investment (Henderson
& Cockburn, Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005), and how ﬁrms link through R&D alliances
( A r o r a ,F o s f u r i ,&G a m b a r d e l l a ,2 0 0 1 ;M o w e r y ,O x l e y ,&S i l v e r m a n ,1 9 9 6 ;R o s e n k o p f&
Almeida, 2003). However, possibly due to the diﬃculty of looking inside the black box
of the ﬁrm, little empirical work has been devoted to exploring how ﬁrms organize R&D
internally, for example by centralizing or decentralizing this function.1 Though there is a
growing literature on the geographical location and management of R&D activities (e.g.,
Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Singh, 2008; Lahiri, 2010) especially across national boundaries
(e.g. Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Kuemmerle, 1999, Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2006),
the question of geography is logically distinct from the question of internal organization.2
For although the location of activities obviously has implications for how they should be
managed, other considerations such as access to users, talented researchers, or knowledge
spillovers are arguably more important considerations (Kogut, 1991; Alcácer, 2006; Jaﬀe,
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993). By contrast, the salient trade-oﬀ in the internal orga-
nization of R&D involves the allocation of decision making within the organization about
1Notable exceptions include DeSanctis, Glass & Ensing, (2002), Birkinshaw, Nobel and Ridderstale
(2002), Argyres and Silverman, Kastl et al., Kay, which are discussed in greater detail below.
2For example, as Singh puts it, a ﬁrm could have a decentralized formal organization even with rela-
tively small number of R&D locations, while another ﬁrm might have a much more centralized organization
despite having a much greater number of R&D locations.
2which R&D projects to fund and how to manage them. This in turn focuses attention on
diﬀerences in information and incentives within ﬁrms.
O u ra n a l y s i si sm o t i v a t e db yat r a d e - o ﬀ between local information and the internal
capture of spillovers. Though units may have superior local information, such as about
the needs of their customers (Furman, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Von Hippel, 1998),
unit managers may also be more likely to ignore the potential spillovers from their research
for other parts of the ﬁrm (Nobel & Birkinshaw, 1998), due to a lack of knowledge (Hitt
& Hoskisson, 1990), or because unit managers tend be rewarded principally for the perfor-
mance of their own units, not that of the ﬁrm as a whole. The ﬂipside of the this trade-oﬀ
is that centralized R&D, by being able to invest in longer term and riskier projects, can
incorporate potential spillovers better, but may risk losing information on what customers
need. Also, though corporate R&D labs’ resources may attract more talented researchers
and thus increase productivity, these researchers may choose projects for their scientiﬁc
interest rather than their economic potential alone. Put diﬀerently, in some instances,
central R&D labs may be subject to “capture” by the researchers employed there.
This basic trade-oﬀ has several implications for the conditions under which we should
expect to observe decentralization and for the consequences of decentralization. In this
study, we develop a novel dataset that details the organization of patent origination and
patent assignment in a signiﬁcant subset of American ﬁrms. We complement this with
patent-level data on whether inventors were located in corporate R&D labs or elsewhere
in the organization (we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our measures in section
3). It is plausible that decentralization of R&D is also associated with delegation of other
types of authority for managing innovation, such as managing IP and licensing. However,
for sharpness in exposition we speak of “R&D decentralization” when the managers of
divisions, business units or wholly owned subsidiaries (hereafter collectively referred to as
“units”) make the key decisions such as which types of R&D projects should be funded,
how the projects and the resulting IP should be managed. By contrast, “centralized”
R&D is associated with a central R&D organization, managed by executives reporting to
headquarters (rather than a unit), and typically conducted in a corporate R&D lab.
Our paper combines data from several sources: (i) patent level information from the
United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO), (ii) ownership structure data from
Icarus and Amadeus by Bureau Van Dyke (BVD), (iii) data on location of corporate
3R&D labs in the United States from the Directory of American Research and Technology,
the US Oﬃce of Management and Budget’s Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSA areas)
database, and a commercial zip-code matching database (iv) Merger and acquisition data
from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum and Zephyr by Bureau Van Dyke, (v) accounting
information from U.S. Compustat. Our sample includes 595,396 patents that are matched
to 1,491 American publicly-listed corporations, a total of 30,834 of their private and public
units, of which 2,615 was assigned at least one patent.
We matched a total of 595,396 patents to our ﬁrm sample, where 112,428 of these
patents (18.9%) are assigned to units. To anticipate our results, we ﬁnd that decentraliza-
tion of R&D is more extensive for ﬁrms that operate in discrete technology industries, rely
more heavily on acquisitions, and that manage a diverse range of technologies. Consistent
with prior ﬁndings (Argyres & Silverman, 2004), decentralized research is more incremen-
tal in nature, narrow in scope, and less likely to draw upon scientiﬁc research. In addition,
we ﬁnd that decentralized ﬁrms tend to invest less in R&D and generate fewer patents
from their R&D, but also grow faster. Intriguingly, we also ﬁnd that whereas the existence
of corporate labs is associated with higher market value, the extent of decentralization is
positively associated with the market value of the ﬁrms. These ﬁndings underline the
importance of R&D projects that focus on what customers want, while also pointing to
the value that centralized R&D can create through greater eﬃciency and by coordinating
projects to capture R&D spillovers. They suggest that ﬁrms may create more value from
R&D by creatively linking central R&D to the needs of the downstream businesses.
Though we build upon a number of studies of the organization of R&D in large ﬁrms,
our paper is novel in two important respects: Instead of survey-based measures or case
studies used in the earlier studies, we develop a new measure based on patent assignments
and supplemented by a direct measure of whether patents originate within a corporate
R&D lab, as opposed to originating in other parts of the ﬁrm. This enables us to use a
much larger sample and allows for a systematic, large scale, empirical examination of the
determinants of the organization of R&D. Second, unlike the vast bulk of the previous
literature, we also link R&D organization to measurable outcomes: sales growth and
market value. Although we do not claim to establish causal relationships, we are able
to provide a sounder empirical basis for various theoretical perspectives on organizational
structure and the implications for ﬁrm performance.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our paper in the literature.
Section 3 develops our hypotheses on the contrasting implications of centralizing versus
decentralized R&D in multi-unit ﬁrms. In Section 4 we discuss the limitations of using
patent assignments to measure the decentralization of R&D, and how we mitigate some
of the problems by using data on inventor location within the organization. Section 4
describes the data and our principal measures. Section 5 presents our empirical ﬁndings
on how decentralization is related to the ﬁrm’s environment, and the nature of its research.
Section 6 explores the relationship between decentralization and outcomes. Section 7
concludes by summarizing our ﬁndings and discussing the implications for theory and
practice as well as suggestions for future research.
2 Decentralization of tasks and authority in organi-
zations broadly deﬁned
2.1 Organization of R&D within multidivisional ﬁrms
The tension between centralization and decentralization of R&D in American corporations
is well illustrated by Hounshell and Smith’s (1988) classic study of R&D at Du Pont, with
its vivid description of the ﬁrm’s oscillations between these forms. Du Pont’s pre-WWI
diversiﬁcation eﬀorts created a situation where centralized R&D was deemed as insuﬃ-
ciently responsive to the needs of a diverse set of businesses which included explosives,
celluloid plastics and ﬁlms, lacquers, paints and varnishes, and dyestuﬀs. Consequently,
individual business units were given authority in the 1920’s over their R&D activities, and
each business created a separate research division. However, the various businesses were
still connected by a common scientiﬁc base, as shown by the hugely successful nitrocel-
lulose lacquer Duco, which was invented by the cellulose division instead of the paints
and varnish division. Though Duco was a major success, it highlighted the problems with
decentralized R&D —these intra-ﬁrm spillovers required extensive coordination, which is
better managed in a central R&D organization. For instance, using Duco for furniture
required additional technical advances in resins, which had to be carried out by Du Pont’s
central R&D organization. Thus, under Charles Stine R&D gradually swung back towards
centralization which was again the dominant form by 1928. Centralization of R&D was
also motivated by growth opportunities. For instance, even as the rayon business matured,
5researchers in the rayon division were constrained to work only on cellulosic ﬁbers (from
which Rayon had come), and the general manager of the Rayon division was reluctant to
authorize more broad ranging research in synthetic ﬁbers. As one R&D manager noted in
1933:
“ I no u rs o m et e ny e a r sr a y o ne x p e r i e n c e ,w eh a v ei nb u tt w oc a s e sb e n ta n y
part of our research program in a direction other than one relating directly to
the most immediate manufacturing and selling problems ... Unless we conclude
that there will be no radical departures in the synthetic ﬁber (or ﬁlm) industry
in the next ten years, then it must be concluded that our technical program falls
short in its more radical and forward looking aspects” (Hounshell and Smith,
1988: 181-182).
The relevant point for our discussion, as Argyris and Silverman (2004) also stress,
is that decentralized R&D tends to be product focused, whereas central R&D groups are
better able and better motivated to invest in more basic, non-speciﬁcR & D .A n ds o m e t i m e s
this type of research yields huge payoﬀs, such as Nylon. A lesser known impact of this
miracle ﬁber was the eﬀect it had on the organization of R&D at Du Pont, by providing the
justiﬁcation for a major investment in basic research and a focus on science. Indeed, the
new laboratory for fundamental research was dubbed “Purity Hall” by Du Pont chemists,
signifying its distance from the grubbier concerns of the businesses. This is another feature
of centralized research: Along with a focus on non-speciﬁc research, centralized R&D also
tends to be more scientiﬁc in its orientation.
The strengths and weaknesses of centralized research are evident in other contexts
as well. For example, IBM’s scientists laid the foundations for relational databases, but
IBM’s database division (which rightfully should have commercialized it) was seemingly
unaware of it until Larry Ellison’s startup SDL (the precursor to Oracle) appropriated the
technology from readily available IBM scientiﬁc publications (Bhaskarabhatla, 2010). It is
unlikely that it would have been developed in a more product oriented divisional R&D lab.
Yet, as the example also shows, the origins in central R&D also hindered its exploitation
by the business unit.
62.2 The Trade-oﬀ
These examples show both the power of centralization and the potential drawbacks which
may encourage decentralization. Scholars have emphasized many channels through which
decentralization in general may aﬀect behavior, such as decentralization being associated
with higher ﬂexibility (Child, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979), independence (Kanter, 1985), ini-
tiative (Chandler, 1977), or merely through the motivation arising from the perception
of freedom (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) or pride of ownership (Estrin et al. 1987).
Our paper, however, is speciﬁcally focused on the inherent trade-oﬀs between centraliza-
tion and decentralization of R&D, and contributes to the literature broadly motivated by
similar questions. Nobel and Birkinshaw’s (1987) studied the organization of R&D in a
sample of 115 MNCs, relating the type of R&D unit to how it is managed. Subsequent
work such as Birkinshaw et al., (2002) explored a related aspect of R&D organization,
namely whether R&D units have autonomy and whether they are integrated with other
units. Using a combination of case studies and surveys they found that R&D that adapts
technology to the needs of local units is decentralized, whereas R&D for creating new
k n o w l e d g ei sm o r ec e n t r a l i z e d .
However, our study diﬀers from these in three important ways. First, by concentrating
in US-based ﬁrms we strip away the international component (and its various county-
level confounding factors (Kogut, 1991)). Second, we rely upon observable patent-based
measures instead of the survey measures that often underpin intra-organizational study
(e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990 ), and as a result, have much larger sample sizes. Third,
and most importantly, our study also links outcomes to decentralization instead of simply
exploring how R&D decentralization is related to the nature of R&D.
Kay (1988) discusses characteristics of R&D projects that increase the tendency to-
wards increased centralization. First, since a project may feed into several downstream
products, R&D has potential economies of scope. However, individual business units
would be less likely to invest in R&D projects that provide beneﬁts to other units in the
ﬁrm (Hitt & Hoskisson, 1990; Saxenian, 1994; Feinberg & Gupta, 2004; Gupta & Govin-
darajan, 2000; Nobel & Birkinshaw, 1998; Hitt & Hoskisson, 1990; Saxenian, 1994)).
Second, R&D has uncertain returns, which combined with the fact that business unit
managers are mobile (Podolny & Baron, 1997), will disfavor projects where the payoﬀ
7may come after a manager has moved on to other ﬁrm or unit. Mobile managers will also
disfavor investment R&D projects with long lags and lumpy investments (Argyres & Sil-
verman, 2004; Cockburn, Henderson, & Stern, 1999; Ghemawat, 1987; Leiponen & Helfat,
2010; Roberts & McEvily, 2004). Consistent with this, Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001)
ﬁnd that corporate managers are more likely to pursue opportunities in new markets than
are unit managers. Henderson and Clark (1990) conclude that central R&D labs are less
reliant on local information channels and more likely to explore broader architectural in-
novations. Lerner and Wulﬀ (2007) ﬁnd that in ﬁrms with centralized R&D, long-term
incentives for managers go together with more heavily cited and original patents, but
that this eﬀect does not exist in ﬁrm with decentralized R&D structures, suggesting that
centralized R&D is more conducive to encouraging more original research.
On the other hand, there are counteracting inﬂuences for some R&D to be conducted
and managed by the individual business units (and increase the tendency toward decreased
centralization). Individual units may have superior access to local knowledge, such as in-
formation about customer needs, and therefore better evaluate what sorts of projects will
have a higher payoﬀ.A l s o , c e n t r a l R & D i s e ﬀectively ﬁnanced by a tax on individual
business units, which potentially distorts incentives inside ﬁrms (Kay, 1988). More impor-
tantly perhaps, as the R&D management literature has repeatedly found (Hill, Martin,
& Harris, 2000; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Reger, 1999) a close interaction between R&D
and functions such as marketing and manufacturing is often the diﬀerence between success
and failure.
Our work is also related to a large economics literature on decentralization of tasks
and authority in organizations. This work tents to be theoretical (see Mookherjee 2004
for a review of the economics literature), and empirical studies remain scarce. Most of the
empirical studies focus on the impact of changes in communication costs or the adoption
of information technology. For example, using US data, Rajan and Wulf (2005) provide
empirical evidence that ﬁrms tend to select ﬂatter organizational structures in more recent
years relative to the past. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) and Caroli and Van
Reenen (2001) ﬁnd that with greater investment in information technology, ﬁrms tend
to adopt more decentralized organizational structures. Acemoglu et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
British and French manufacturing ﬁrms in the 1990s closer to the technological frontier,
operating in more heterogeneous environments, or younger, are more likely to decentralize.
8Colombo and Delmastro (2004) ﬁnd that local information increases decentralization to
plant managers in Italian ﬁrms, as does superior communication technology, but central-
ization increases with the need for coordination. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2008)
ﬁnd that trust and social norms increase decentralization as does product market com-
petition (interpreted as a proxy for importance of local information). These empirical
exercises generally frame the issue in terms of diﬀerences in information (e.g., Radner and
Jacob Marschak 1972) and diﬀerences in incentives within ﬁrms.
In our context, a unit may have more information than headquarters about which
research projects are worth pursuing, which inventions are worth patenting, which patents
are worth maintaining and enforcing, and which licensing deals are worthwhile. Superior
information implies that the unit can make better decisions. For instance, Bradley, et.
al. (2010) conclude that greater decentralization enables unit mangers to exercise greater
discretion in dealing with the demands of the unit’s environment. However, though better
informed about its own needs, the unit may be ill-informed about those other parts of the
ﬁrm. Thus, leaving the unit with the authority over these decisions has to be balanced
against other considerations. One is the cost and time involved in communicating the
relevant information up the hierarchy, needed to coordinate the actions of the various
units. The cost of information transfer need not only be physical costs and delay. The
unit, though having superior information, may hide it or shade it because its interests are
not fully aligned with those of the ﬁrm as a whole. This consideration animate both the
theory of transaction costs (e.g., Williamson, 1975) and the principal-agent theory (Jensen
and Meckling, 1992). The property rights view provides a complementary perspective.
M a n a g e r si nt h eu n i tm a yf e a rb e i n g“ h e l d -up” by top management, and thus under-
invest. Decentralization is a means of credibly assuring them against such expropriation.
For instance, Riordan (1990) provides a model in which a principal delegates authority
to provide incentives for cost reduction. Aghion and Tirole (1997) provide a model in
which a principal delegates authority as a credible way of leaving information rents with
the agent, so as to provide incentives for suitable choice of projects. Similarly, Belenzon,
Berkovitz and Bolton (2009) argue that units in business groups have superior incentives
to invest in more basic innovation because they enjoy greater legal protection against the
“parent” ﬁrm expropriating their rents from innovation.
Two recent studies address the trade-oﬀ we are concerned with more directly, and pro-
9vide useful touch points for our paper. Kastl et al. (2009) frame their study of mostly
small Italian manufacturing ﬁrms in terms of whether decentralization — delegation of
authority regarding R&D as well as ﬁnancial, administrative and business decisions to
divisions and units — provides superior incentives for investment in R&D. They ﬁnd that
decentralization is associated with greater investments in R&D in Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms. They also explore the determinants of decentralization and ﬁnd, contrary to Ace-
moglu et al. (2007), that age, distance to the technology frontier, and heterogeneity of
the environment are not associated with decentralization. Argyres & Silverman (2004)
study the organization of R&D in a sample of 71 large US corporations, focusing speciﬁ-
cally on the organization of R&D, rather than the organization of the ﬁrm more broadly
(in contrast to Kastl, et.al.). They hypothesize and ﬁnd that decentralized R&D results
in lower impact research outcomes, and with research that is narrower in technical and
organizational scope. Once again, our study is distinctive in a number of respects. As
discussed above, we do not use survey based measures of decentralization. Instead, we use
observed behavior (i.e., whether patents are assigned to the parent entity or decentralized
to divisions) as a measure of the extent of decentralization, complemented by whether the
patent was produced by a corporate R&D lab. Patent data are widely available and our
study opens the possibility for further research using patent assignments in this manner.
Our sample also diﬀers signiﬁcantly, as it consists of nearly 1,300 large, publicly traded, US
ﬁrms, allowing us to explore both the determinants and consequences of decentralization.
Thus, we study not only the nature of R&D (Argyres & Silverman, 2004) and the amount
of R&D (Kastl, Martimort, & Piccolo, 2009), we also study how decentralization is related
to patenting behavior itself (i.e., we estimate a patent production function). Moreover,
we also study how the extent of decentralization is related to sales growth and the market
value of the ﬁrm.
3H y p o t h e s e s
We have three main sets of hypotheses. The ﬁrst concerns the nature of decentralized
research activities as compared to centralized activities. The second concerns the im-
plications of decentralization for extent of investment in R&D and patenting, and third
concerns the consequences for growth and market value.
103.1 The nature of decentralized research:
Since unit managers are rewarded primarily for the short-term performance of their own
unit, they will tend to favor research projects with short term goals, and disfavor pioneering
projects. Consequently, units will have limited incentives to invest in research that could
spill over to other parts of the ﬁrm. Indeed, competition for resources inside the ﬁrm may
create incentives against such research, lest it allow other divisions to use the fruits of
the research and claim additional resources, as was the case with Duco and the Cellulose
Division in Du Pont. Siggelkow and Rivkin (2006) argue that delegation will enable
low-level managers to screen out alternatives that do not serve their parochial interests.
By contrast, centralized R&D is conducive to more pioneering research, research that
explores new markets, and more fundamental advances (Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001;
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Lerner and Wulﬀ, 2007). Furthermore, centralization of R&D
also facilitates greater coordination across the various units. This coordination is more
valuable when the units share common technologies (i.e., are more closely related) or if
the products (of the various units) themselves must be mutually compatible or have other
forms of inter-dependencies. Thus, centralization of R&D is more likely to be observed
when the ﬁrm operates a narrow range of businesses, or if the underlying technology is
“complex”, with marketable products being composed of many diﬀerent parts, produced
by distinct businesses (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh,
2000). Firms also diﬀer both in the extent to which they acquire other businesses, and
how they deal with such acquisitions. Centralization is obviously easier to manage if
acquisitions are relatively rare, because each acquisition would then require integration
of new research teams and organizations (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Grossman & Hart,
1986; Szulanski, 1996). Conversely, decentralized ﬁrms would naturally ﬁnd it easier to
deal with acquisitions.
Following conventional practice in the management and strategy literature, we restate
the above as hypotheses. We couch our hypotheses as patterns of association we expect
in the data, rather than as causal relationships. The causal relationships underlying
these relationships are important. However, examining whether the expected patterns of
association exist is a test, though not a conclusive one, of the predictions of the underlying
theories. Moreover, establishing causality would require identifying exogenous sources in
11v a r i a t i o ni nh o wﬁrms organize their R&D, a topic we leave for future research. For
clarity, we have compared two ideal types, centralization and decentralization. However,
as Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) argue, and as Du Pont’s history shows, ﬁrms will often
try to get the best of both worlds by developing hybrid structures. These structures can
take two complementary forms. First, central R&D labs can coexist with R&D in units.
Central labs take on more fundamental and longer range projects while units undertake
more product —focused and short-term projects (consistent with the hypotheses developed
below). Insofar as R&D itself is subject to scale economies — small labs may not be
viable or cost eﬀective — ﬁrms may concentrate activities in central labs but force the labs
to devote some fraction of their eﬀorts on projects desired by units. In eﬀect, the labs
become a seller of R&D services to the units. Conceptually, this is a hybrid form of R&D
organization, where decentralization of authority is not coterminous with decentralization
of the location of the activity. Although we do not theorize about this hybrid form of
organization, we explore this distinction in our empirical analysis.
Hypothesis 1: Centralized R&D is more likely to be observed in ﬁrms where spillovers
are greater: ﬁrms operating in a narrow range of businesses, in more closely related busi-
nesses, and in complex technologies. Centralized R&D is less likely in ﬁrms that actively
acquire external businesses.
Hypothesis 2: Centralized R&D will be more scientiﬁc in orientation, broader in scope,
and have more technical impact. Conversely, decentralized R&D will be less scientiﬁc,
narrower in scope, and incremental.
3.2 Organization of R&D and investment
Theoretical perspectives provide less pointed guidance on how the diﬀerent organizational
forms are associated with outcomes. For instance, the quantum of R&D investment by
a ﬁrm can have a complex relationship with how the ﬁrm organizes its R&D, in part
because ﬁrms facing richer opportunities for technical advancement are more likely to
develop central R&D labs to exploit those opportunities. Even holding opportunities
and other factors constant, however, centralization will be associated with greater R&D
investment. Intuitively, suppose that the ﬁrm decides on a cost of capital (a hurdle rate
of return that projects must meet), and the units choose R&D projects that exceed the
hurdle rate. One can imagine budgets of corporate R&D labs being decided in a similar
12fashion. If the hurdle rates for the two are the same, then units will invest less in R&D
than corporate labs, because units will ignore potential spillovers to other parts of the
ﬁrm (perhaps because they are unaware of the spillovers). This is an instance of the
more general result that activities with positive externalities will be underprovided by a
decentralized system (such as a market). Central R&D labs will take a broader view of
the beneﬁts ﬂowing from their research, and thus are likely to undertake projects that
would be rejected by a unit with more parochial interests (see H1). Furthermore, whereas
R&D in units are typically part of a proﬁt center (with competing claims for the overall
investments the unit makes), central labs are typically cost centers. The net result is that
a greater decentralization of innovation activities in a ﬁrm should be associated with lower
investment in R&D.
The diﬀerence in the types of research projects undertaken, discussed in H2 also has
implications for patent propensity. Insofar as decentralized R&D projects are focused on
improving existing products and processes, and less likely than central R&D projects to
pioneer new products and technologies, their results may be intrinsically less patentable.
In some cases, units are more likely to forgo patents, because patents are sometimes op-
tions on the future. Unit managers may be less willing to invest in such long-term options,
at least as compared with managers of central R&D labs. Thus, decentralization should
be associated with fewer patents per dollar of R&D investment. Conversely, insofar as
centralized R&D projects are broader in scope and more scientiﬁc in orientation, the out-
comes are more patentable as well. Further, central R&D labs may have greater incentives
to patent as a way of signaling their productivity and justifying their budgets. By contrast,
R&D in units is more likely to be measured by how it contributes to the performance of
the unit, rather than solely by measures such as patenting and publication. Formally we
have that:
Hypothesis 3: Greater centralization of R&D is associated with greater investments in
R&D, and with greater patenting propensity.
3.3 Organization of R&D and outcomes
The organization of R&D not only aﬀects the type and number of R&D projects that
are funded but also but also the eﬀectiveness of the R&D eﬀort. On the face of it, the
implications for performance are ambiguous. However, we can identify some more nuanced
13implications for sales and value creation.
Decentralized research should help the business unit grow by improving products and
reducing costs. However, centralized research can help develop new markets. However,
insofar as decentralization also brings greater control over IP management, it should also
result in less licensing. This is because unit managers are typically rewarded for sales
and proﬁt growth, and so are more likely than central licensing units to eschew licensing
opportunities which might strengthen competitors and hurt their own sales, even if the
licensing revenues more than oﬀset the implied proﬁt loss at the corporate level (see Arora,
Fosfuri and Roende, 2010 for a formal model). More generally, greater autonomy to units
may result in “empire building” by unit managers, which would also manifest is higher
sales growth.
Though perhaps associated with higher sales growth, decentralization of R&D need not
result in greater value creation. Indeed, neither theory nor historical experience suggest
that either form of organization is overall superior to the other. The neglect of spillovers
and the reluctance to invest in longer-term research will result in unrealized opportunities
for value creation under decentralized research. Conversely, though centralization may
capture spillovers more eﬀectively and pioneer technologies for new markets, central R&D
labs are also less knowledgeable about and less responsive to the needs of existing cus-
tomers. However, though neither form is more valuable on average, the value created
by the marginal project under each form will systematically diﬀer. As H3 posits, units
will underinvest in R&D, particularly that which has potential spillovers for the ﬁrm as a
whole, so that the marginal R&D project by units creates more value for the ﬁrm than its
cost. There is no reason to believe that central labs underinvest. Moreover, since central
labs are also prone to capture by researchers that value scientiﬁcc u r i o s i t y ,t h em a r g i n a l
centralized R&D project may even actually destroy value.
Since theory does not predict that either form of organization is superior to the other,
the empirical implications are subtle. Firms will create central R&D labs when rich op-
portunities for signiﬁcant technical advance exist, as hypothesized in H1. It follows that a
central lab may be associated with greater value because it signals richer technical oppor-
tunities. Further, the value of centralized research will be greater when spillovers are more
probable. Put diﬀerently, centralized research is more valuable when the ﬁrm’s businesses
share a technical base, as is the case when the businesses are closely related. However, the
14marginal project of units will be more valuable than the marginal project in central R&D
labs. Collecting these implications together we have:
Hypothesis 4a: The value of centralized research is greater when R&D spillovers are
more likely. The marginal value from decentralized research is greater than from central-
ized research.
Hypothesis 4b: The marginal value created from decentralized research is greater than
from centralized research.
4 Data and measures
Our paper combines data from several sources: (i) patent level information from the
United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO), (ii) ownership structure data from
I c a r u sa n dA m a d e u sb yB u r e a uV a nD y k e( B V D ) ,( i i i )M e r g e ra n da c q u i s i t i o nd a t af r o m
Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum and Zephyr by Bureau Van Dyke, and (iv) accounting
information from U.S. Compustat. The Appendix details the procedures used to construct
the various datasets that comprise our platform.
Patents. Patent data are from the USPTO for the period 1975-2007. We match
all granted patents to our sample of publicly traded American ﬁrms and their American
aﬃliates. The matching is based on comparing the assignee name and address as it appears
on the patent document to the name and address of companies in Icarus and Zephyr. Thus
we are able to distinguish between centrally assigned patents - patents that are directly
assigned to the parent company, and decentralized patents - patents that are assigned to
aﬃliates. We matched a total of 594,903 patents to our ﬁnal sample of Compustat ﬁrms.
107,654 of these patents (18.1%) are assigned to aﬃliates (that is, separate legal entities
that are diﬀerent from the headquarters ﬁrm).
Patent quality. We measure patent quality using the number of forward citations the
patent receives over its life-cycle. Our Basic characteristics variables include the number of
citations the patent makes to non-patent (scientiﬁc) literature, generality and originality.3
3We follow the widely accepted methodology developed by Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaﬀe (1997)
and deﬁne patent generality as inversely proportional to the concentration of the citations it receives









15The number of citations the patent makes to scientiﬁc article is an indication of the extent
the patent relies on scientiﬁc knowledge. Generality is measured as the breadth of the
technology areas across which a patent’s citations are dispersed, and Originality is the
equivalent measure for the citations contained in the patent.
Parent ﬁrms and units. Ownership data consists of two parts: cross-sectional owner-
ship information from Icarus and Amadeus for 2008, and M&A data from SDC Platinum
and Zephyr. The cross-sectional data informs us on existing active aﬃliates, and the
M&A data informs us on historical aﬃliates that may have dissolved or been fully inte-
grated by the parent company, as well as those that have been kept independent. The
appendix provides details on the ownership algorithm used for aﬃliates identiﬁcation and
classiﬁcation.
We supplement and conﬁrm our ownership data by manually collecting information
on all aﬃliates from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database ,
ﬁrms’ annual reports, and from detailed on-line searches. We identify ‘dormant’ aﬃliates
- wholly owned subsidiaries with no signiﬁcant economic activity that are founded mostly
for tax purposes, as well as aﬃliates that are established solely as holding vehicles for the
purpose of IP management.4 Patents that are assigned to these aﬃliates are classiﬁed as
being assigned to the parent company. This screening leaves us with a total of 30,834
aﬃliated ﬁrms. Of these, 2,615 ﬁrms are assigned at least one patent during our sample
period, and thus are kept in the sample.
Where,  denotes citing three-digit U.S. class (419 classes),  is the number of citations received by
patent  from patents in technology ﬁeld  and  is the total number of citations received by patent






addition to patent generality, we also include patent originality, which is the equivalent measure for the
concentration across technology ﬁelds of the citations made by the patent.
4For each acquired ﬁrm we determine whether it remained operational post-acquisition in several steps.
First, we check whether the ﬁrm appears in Amadeus or Icarus as a distinct company. Second, we manually
c h e c ke a c hc o m p a n yl i s t e di nt h eﬁrst step whether it continues to operate independently from the parent
company. We check their corporate websites to conﬁrm that their legal disclaimers and investor relations
information references a parent company. Dissolved acquisitions are much more problematic. Because
we match patents to ﬁrms based on the 2008 ownership structure, we lose historical acquisitions that
were fully integrated in the parent company and ceased to exist as separate legal entities. Though we do
capture post-acquisition patents as those are likely to be assigned to headquarters, we may nonetheless
over measure decentralization (because all historical patents that we do not match are centralized). To
mitigate this problem we performed an exhaustive manual search to identify a signiﬁcant majority of these
absorbed ﬁrms and match them to their patents. Appendix A.1.3 for a description of this process.
164.1 Measuring decentralization of R&D: Patent assignments and
patents from corporate R&D labs
Assignment. We use the share of patents that are assigned to its wholly-owned American
aﬃliates as our ﬁrst measure of decentralization. This measure has the advantage of being
based on observed behavior, useful for large samples, and because it is not based on ad
hoc surveys, deployable in other settings. Still, its use as a measure of decentralization of
R&D raises several issues.
It is possible that a non-incorporated business or division inside a ﬁrm have de facto
authority over its R&D and innovation, but, because it is not a distinct legal entity, not
have patents assigned to it. In other words, assignment of patents to aﬃliates may be a
suﬃcient, but not necessary condition for decentralization of R&D. Even so, our interviews
with R&D and IP managers suggest that the very fact that a unit is a distinct entity, rather
than merely a division of the parent, suggests that the unit enjoys some autonomy The
assignment of patents is a signal, that the unit enjoys a signiﬁcant measure of autonomy.
For example, Genentech, though wholly-owned by Hoﬀman La Roche, directly contracts
on licensing the patents in its charge to outside ﬁrms. Assignment may also reinforce
the identiﬁcation and long-term ties between a manager and the patents she manages, so
that opportunistic behavior becomes costly in terms of reputation (Gibbons, et al., 1999;
Alonso and Matoushek, 2007).5
Mergers and acquisitions are an important source of variation in our data because
decentralized ﬁrms acquire other ﬁrms and the patents that come along with them. We
include in decentralization all patents of the aﬃliate on the grounds that the acquirer
could have chosen to reassign those patents to the parent company post acquisition. In-
deed, companies that are centralized will reassign patents from the aﬃliate to the parent.
Companies which choose not to reassign such acquired patents also tend to assign patents
to the aﬃliate after acquisition. 6 Our results remain unchanged if we use only patents
5Ad i ﬀerent interpretation, which also supports the delegation of authority interpretation, is that units
which may be potentially divested in the future are also likely to be assigned the patents they generate.
For instance, one of the managers we interviewed pointed to the diﬃculties Motorola faced when divesting
its semiconductors manufacturing business (now called Freescale Semiconductors), in sorting out which
Motorola patents were going to be assigned to the divested business.
6The share of reassigned patents is similar between M&A and internal patents. For M&A patents,
8% are reassigned (8,410 patents), where for internal patents, 7% are reassigned (32,834 patents). For
M&A-related reassignments, 23% are reassignments from aﬃliates to headquarters, where for internal
17produced post-acquisition. However, we acknowledge that our assignment measure may
capture not simply how R&D is organized but also how IP management is organized.
A related issue is that patent assignments may reﬂect merely the authority to manage
IP management rather than R&D. Our interviews suggest otherwise: R&D managers and
IP managers we interviewed agreed that when patents are assigned to units from projects
that the units managed (and paid for out of their R&D budgets).
Patent assignments are sometimes driven by income tax strategies. Indeed, within our
sample, some ﬁrms were found to assign all patents to wholly owned subsidiaries located in
states with favorable tax conditions, such as lack of tax on royalty incomes. To mitigate
this, we conservatively classify all such assignments as if the patents were assigned to the
parent ﬁrm, even if they were assigned to an aﬃliate in the favorable state. Patent assign-
ment may also be driven by a desire to have patents assigned in the name of the relevant
business to make it easier to assert patents, obtain injunctions, and receive adequate dam-
ages. However, they could just as well be assigned to the parent for reputational reasons
(Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009). Thus, patent assignments likely measure decentral-
ization of R&D with error. Although this is not classical measurement error, it is likely
that the estimated coeﬃcients suﬀer from attenuation bias. Another potential concern,
which is less salient in our context, is that it is logically possible that a unit may receive
patent assignments without enjoying the hypothesized autonomy. To better understand
the importantce of this conceren we conducted several interviews with IP managers, at-
torneys, and high level executive at ﬁrms across industries within our sample. All of these
discussion reinforced the interpretation that unit-assignment is strongly associated with
eﬀective delegation of authority in the R&D process. In fact, not one person interviewed
found this association surprising.
Corporate R&D labs. We supplement the assignment measure with a diﬀerent measure
of the R&D structure. Using information on corporate R&D labs, we match whether the
inventors are located close to the corporate labs. One limitation faced by many studies
that utilize location as a measure concerns the multiple towns and cities that are often
within the same metropolitan region. Thus, relying solely on Zip code or city name, one
would miss that Boston and Cambridge facilities may in fact be within the same R&D
complex. This is even more problematic when we match to inventors, since inventors’
patents, about 91% of reassignments are from headquarters to aﬃliates.
18addresses are more prone to variation within the area around an R&D lab (as they live in
suburbs, etc.). To counter this, we match our data to two diﬀerent databases, one which
converts city names to Zip codes, and one from the US Census Bureau which matches
Zip Codes to the US Oﬃce of Management and Budget’s Core-Based Statistical Areas
(CBSA areas). We use the Directory of American Research and Technology, which lists
such facilities for all publicly traded companies in America. This gives us the city and zip
code information for each ﬁrm’s R&D lab. Similarly, we obtain inventor information for
all patents from the USPTO database. Once we have identiﬁe dt h eC B S Ac o d ef o re a c h
inventor and each lab, we identify every patent in our sample where at least one inventor
is located in the same CBSA as a lab (at the ﬁrm level). Our results are unchanged if we
deﬁne patents generated by corporate R&D labs as those where every inventor is located
i nt h es a m eC B S Aa sal a b .
Patents generated by corporate R&D labs should reﬂect the fruits of centralized re-
search because corporate R&D labs are typically part of a central R&D organization,
reporting into corporate headquarters through corporate R&D managers rather than to
heads of divisions. By contrast, patents not generated from corporate R&D labs should
reﬂect the R&D activities taking place in units, especially in the R&D, engineering and
manufacturing functions in the units. Thus, the share of patents generated by corporate
R&D labs is another measure of the decentralization of R&D. We ﬁnd empirical support
in our data for this assumption, as the vast majority of patents produced by corporate
R&D labs are indeed assigned to the parent ﬁrm
As with assignments, using corporate labs to measure R&D centralization could be
misleading if the ﬁrm’s central R&D is not associated with a registered corporate lab.
In particular, many ﬁrms do not have a registered corporate labs, pointing to the lumpy
nature of such facilities. Moreover, the R&D activities relevant to units may take place
in corporate R&D labs (or in collaboration with them). This makes sense because al-
though the theoretical discussion has contrasted centralized and decentralized R&D, many
ﬁrms are likely to form hybrid arrangements in their search for the best of both systems
(Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). Indeed, a signiﬁcant share of patents assigned to aﬃliates
comes from corporate R&D labs, perhaps reﬂecting a hybrid arrangement, where research
is performed in a corporate lab but where the project is chosen, paid for, and perhaps
even managed (through a matrix reporting arrangement) by the unit. Based on our in-
19terviews, we conclude that in such cases the resulting patents would generally be assigned
to the relevant unit. In other words, these two empirical proxies — patents generated out-
side corporate labs and patent assignment to units measure related but diﬀerent facets of
R&D decentralization in an organization. In general, we ﬁnd that the two measures pro-
vide qualitatively similar results, although there are diﬀerences in statistical and economic
signiﬁcance, which we discuss in section 5.
Accounting and ﬁnancial data. Accounting data are from U.S. Compustat. We match
our ﬁrms using a string name process similar to the one we utilize to match patents to
our ownership structure data. Please see Appendix A.2.2 for details on the algorithms.
The book value of capital is the net stock of property, plant and equipment; Employment
is the number of employees. R&D is used to create R&D capital stocks calculated using
a perpetual inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate (Hall, Jaﬀea n dT r a j t e n b e r g ,
2005). So the R&D stock, ,i ny e a r is  =  +( 1− )−1 where  is
the R&D expenditure in year  and  =0 15. Patents stock, , is calculated in an
analogous way. Patents stock in year  is  =  +( 1− )−1 where  is the
citations-weights ﬂow of patents in year . To control for patent quality we weight each
patent by the ratio between the number of citations it receives and one plus the average
number of citations received by all patents that were granted in the same year (one is
added to both numerator and denominator to avoid zero weights). Firm value is the sum
of the values of common stock, preferred stock and total debt net of current assets. The
book value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment, inventories, investments
in unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangibles other than R&D. Tobin’s Q (market value
over capital) was winsorized by setting it to 0.1 for values below 0.1 and at 20 for values
above 20.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on our ﬁrm sample. Our sample’s average ﬁrm
is valued at $1.4 billion, has $3.6 billion in sales, $488 million in R&D stock, and holds
a stock of 132 cites-weighted patents. The share of patents that are assigned to aﬃliates
across ﬁrms is 36%. Using the patent as the unit of analysis, 18.1% of patents are assigned
to aﬃliates (as we shall see later, ﬁrms that patent a lot are less likely to assign patents
to aﬃliates, which explains the diﬀerence between patent and ﬁrm-level assignment). The
average patent receives 8.9 (or 11.3 when restricting the sample to patents that receive at
least one citation). 27% of patents are generated by corporate R&D labs.
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5 Econometric results
5.1 The nature of decentralized research
Table 2 reports the unconditional diﬀerences in the means of patents assigned to aﬃliates
and centrally assigned patents. The ﬁrst column shows that centrally assigned patents
receive more citations, cite non-patent references (i.e., cite scientiﬁc publications) more
frequently, and are more general, than patents assigned to aﬃliates. We then divide
patents into those generated by corporate R&D labs and others. Although the same
pattern of relationships is evident in both samples, the diﬀerences between centrally as-
signed patents and decentralized are smaller in patents that corporate labs produce. For
instance, whereas the diﬀerence in the average number of citations received between cen-
trally assigned and decentralized patents is 0.23 in patents that corporate labs generate,
the diﬀerence doubles to 0.49 in patents produced elsewhere (i.e., outside corporate labs).
In other words, the nature of the research depends upon where in the organization it is
performed as well as for whom it is performed. This is consistent with the interpretation
is that patent generated by corporate R&D labs but assigned to aﬃliates represent a hy-
brid organization — one where the ﬁrm tries to get capture the spillovers from research by
coordinating research in labs but also tries to make R&D more responsive to the needs of
its businesses. This interpretation is explored more systematically below.
Table 2 does not control for a variety of ﬁrm and industry speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s .T o
do so, we estimate a Probit model in which the dependent variable takes value 1 if the
patent is assigned to an aﬃliate (decentralized) and zero otherwise. Note well that we
undertake this as a convenient way of capturing the patterns in the data. Put diﬀerently,
table 2 would have suggested regressing characteristics such as the number of citations,
generality and originality on whether the patent is assigned to an aﬃliate and whether the
patent is generated by a corporate lab. Such a regression would have yielded an estimate
of the mean conditional on decentralization. Reversing the operation proves to be a more
convenient way of summarizing the patterns in the data, but the diﬀerence is merely
in exposition: The theory developed posits that certain types of research (incremental,
short term and product-focused) are more likely to be decentralized, and ﬁrms in complex
21industries, and focused ﬁrms are more likely to centralize research.
Table 3 reports the estimation results (marginal eﬀects of a Probit model). Here the
general pattern of results is consistent with the predictions of all three theories. First,
there is a strong positive relationship between discrete technologies and decentralization.
We classify our sample patents to 7 main technology areas based on their International
Patent Classiﬁcation code7. Discrete technology areas are pharmaceuticals, biotechnol-
ogy, and chemicals, where complex technologies include telecommunications, electronics,
semiconductors, and information technology. As column 1 shows, there is a clear pattern
of lower decentralization probability for complex technologies.
Second, our results suggest that patent quality and basicness is negatively related to
decentralization. We ﬁnd that centrally assigned patents tend to receive substantially more
citations than decentralized ones. Based on the estimates of column 1, a one standard
deviation increase in the number of citations received lowers the probability that a patent is
assigned to an aﬃliate by 6.4 percentage points (159×(−0004)), or by 35% percent of the
average probability of aﬃliate assignment. Patent that are assigned to aﬃliates make fewer
citations to non-patent literature than centrally-assigned patents. 106,617 patents make at
least one non-patent citations, and 85% of these patents are centrally assigned. Similarly,
centrally assigned patents are more general and more original. Column 2 conﬁrms that
these results continue to hold when we exclude those patents that receive no citations from
the estimation sample.
Third, column 3 shows a positive eﬀect of technical diversity on decentralization prob-
ability, also consistent with Hypothesis 2. Note however that diversity is strongly related
to the extent of patenting — ﬁrms that patent are lot are also likely to be more focused in
their patenting. Thus, we cannot cleanly separate the eﬀect of size from diversity.
As was also suggested in table 2, we ﬁnd that (compare columns 6 and 7) that the
location of R&D in the organization conditions the foregoing relationships. Patents that
do not originate from corporate R&D labs and are assigned to aﬃliates (decentralized)
receive signiﬁcantly fewer citations, are less likely to cite non-patent prior art, and are less
general and original. However, even patents that are generated by central labs and are
assigned to aﬃliates receive fewer citations compared to patents from central labs that are
centrally assigned. Similarly, compared to centrally assigned patents from central labs,
7Patent that are not classiﬁed to any of the main categories are classiﬁed under Other.
22aﬃliate assigned patents from central labs are less likely to cite non-patent prior art, and
are less general and original.
The remaining speciﬁcations show that these patterns are robust. Column 4 controls
for additional ﬁrm eﬀects by controlling for the share of the ﬁr m ’ sp a t e n t si ne a c ho ft h e
197 major MSAs. Column 2 shows that the patterns hold when we consider only patents
that receive citations (about 130,000 patents, or slightly more than a ﬁfth of patents do
not receive any citations during the sample period). Column 5 shows that the patterns
hold when we restrict the sample of patents to those internally generated by the ﬁrm.
In unreported estimation we ﬁnd that these results are robust when we estimate a linear
probability model with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e., a within-ﬁrm speciﬁcation). The inclusion
of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects raises the R2 substantially, indicating that patent assignment reﬂects
underlying organization structure. However, even with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the diﬀerences in
the nature of centralized and decentralized research are similar to those reported in table
3.
Insert Table 3 here
5.2 Implications of decentralization for innovation
We focus on two measures, R&D investment and patenting. In contrast to the foregoing
analysis, R&D and patenting are studied at the level of the ﬁrm. Although we have
multiple observations per ﬁrm, as the foregoing results show, the organization of R&D
within a ﬁrm is stable over time. Thus, although we include multiple observations per
ﬁrm, we do not exploit within-ﬁrm variation over time in R&D or patenting.
5.2.1 R&D equation
Table 4 reports the estimation results. Consistent with H3, the results show that decen-
tralization is associated with lower investment in R&D. Column 1 shows that increasing
the share of aﬃliate assigned patents from 0 to its mean (0.33), is associated with a 10%
reduction in R&D (033×030). Column 2 shows that the existence of at least one corpo-
rate R&D lab is associated with a 17% increase in R&D, but the eﬀect of assignment to
aﬃliates is unchanged. Column 3 shows that increasing the share of lab generated patents
has a small and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on R&D, and (comparing to column 4),
23this does not aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcient of the share of aﬃliate assigned patents. The
remaining speciﬁcations further explore the robustness of the results. Column 5 shows
that the share of patents acquired in M&A transactions does not condition R&D invest-
ments. Column 6 shows that the results are robust to including the share of the ﬁrm’s
patents in diﬀerent locations (MSAs), indicating that the eﬀects we are measuring, are
not driven by where ﬁrms locate their R&D activities. Columns 7-9 report a very similar
pattern for speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is (&). We control
throughout for size by using lagged sales, and for industry ﬁxed eﬀects (4 digits SIC) and
year dummies. Insofar as assignment is only observed when the ﬁrm has distinct aﬃliates
(instead of divisions), we also control for the number of aﬃliates.
Recall that we have formulated our hypotheses in terms of the patterns of association we
expect to observe. The patterns in table 4 are consistent with hypothesis 3. The existence
of a corporate R&D lab may signal either rich opportunities for technical advancement or
the potential for internal spillovers from research. The implication is higher levels of R&D
investment. However, controlling for the existence of such labs, greater decentralization
is associated with lower R&D investments. This may reﬂect under-investment by units
that research projects that bring limited beneﬁts to them but with beneﬁcial spillovers to
other parts of the ﬁrm.
Insert Table 4 here
5.2.2 Patent equation
We next investigate the patent equation using the ﬂow of patents produced per ﬁrm- per
year and an equivalent speciﬁcation for the ﬂow of patents divided by R&D stock. 8
C o l u m n s1 - 5i nT a b l e5r e p o r tt h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t sf o rt h ea n n u a lﬂow of patents. (in
logs). Column 1 shows a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between the share of patents
assigned to aﬃliates and patent propensity. The coeﬃcient of share aﬃliate assigned
patents is -0.16, implying that an increase this share from 0 to the mean level is associated
with a reduction in patenting of about 5%. As with the R&D equation, controlling for
whether there is a corporate R&D lab is positive and signiﬁcant — a lab is associated with
an increase of about 20% in patenting — consistent with the idea that the presence of a lab
8All results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations, such as Negative Binomial for patents counts.
24signals rich opportunities for technical advance. Once again, the estimated coeﬃcient on
patents assigned to aﬃliates is similar in size and signiﬁcance whether we control for the
presence of a corporate R&D lab or not. As Column 2 also shows, the estimated coeﬃcient
of the share of patents generated from labs is both small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
In all these speciﬁcations, we control for industry eﬀects (4 digit SIC), and year eﬀects,
along with size (lagged sales, in logs), R&D stock (lagged by a year), and by the number
of aﬃliates.
This pattern is robust to controlling for patents acquired through M&A (Column 3),
controlling for the location of the ﬁrm’s R&D activities (controls for MSA in Column
4) or weighting patents by citations (Column 5). Columns 6-9 report the equivalent
speciﬁcations ﬂow of patent, divided by R&D Stock. Column 5 shows a negative and
signiﬁcant relationship between decentralization and patent propensity, similarly robust
to location controls and controls for M&A patents (Column 8) and weighting patents by
citations. The coeﬃcient on share decentralized is -0.187, which implies that increasing
this share from zero to the mean level is associated with a reduction in patents per dollar
of R&D by about 6%. This may appear to be a small eﬀect but recall that decentralized
R&D is associated with lower R&D investments. Insofar as there are diminishing returns to
R&D, a reduction in R&D should have resulted in an increase in patenting per R&D dollar.
Put diﬀerently, the eﬀect of decentralization on the propensity to patenting inventions is
likely larger than the estimated 5-6%.
In contrast to the results on the nature of decentralized research, R&D and patent-
ing behavior seems to be more sensitive to the assignment of patents to aﬃliates rather
than to the share of patents generated from corporate labs. This is consistent with our
interpretation that, roughly speaking, assignment is measuring who (in the organization)
is paying for the corresponding R&D, rather than who (or where in the organization) the
R&D is being performed. Characteristics of research, however, depended both on who
pays for the R&D as well as where the R&D is being performed, as evidenced by table 3.
Insert Table 5 here
255.3 Implications of decentralization for market value and growth
5.3.1 Market value
Hypothesis 4 posits mixed results for the impact of centralization on market value, which
depend on the nature of R&D, and whether or not spillovers are likely. More clearly,
it posits that the marginal value of decentralized R&D will be greater. To this end, we
estimate a simple version of the value function approach proposed by Griliches (1981)9.
The interpretation of a market value regression is not straightforward. The one we follow
here is that this is the value placed upon the stock of the various assets of the ﬁrm. Once
again, we do not exploit within-ﬁrm variation over time because the organization of R&D
within a ﬁrm varies very little over time.
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the market value equation. The reported
standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation
within ﬁrms. We include controls for number of aﬃliates, assets, R&D stock and the total
stock of patents. Column 1 reports coeﬃcient on the share of patents that are assigned
to aﬃliates. 0.245, implying that increasing the share from zero to its mean value of 0.33
would be associated with an increase in market value of about 8.5%. The coeﬃcient on
overall patents stock is positive and signiﬁcant as well, with an estimated elasticity of
about 5%. 10 In column 2 we add controls for share of corporate lab-originated patents
and a dummy for whether the ﬁrm had at least one central lab. Once again, having at least
one corporate lab is associated with an increase in value of about 14%, perhaps signaling
the value placed by investors on the technical opportunities the ﬁrm enjoys. The share
of lab generated patents, however, is negative, implying that decreasing this share from
its mean of 0.27 to 0 would be associated with an increase in value of about 2.5%. These
results are consistent with the mixed implications of the theory developed in which no
9See also Jaﬀe (1986), Hall et al (2005) or Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
10In unreported speciﬁcations, we include a set of three separate indicator variables that capture the
non-linear eﬀect of decentralization. For each ﬁrm we assign a value of 1 to only one of these dummy
variables based on which pattern best describes the ﬁrm’s patents: all patents are centrally assigned
(share decentralized is zero); share decentralized is between zero and 0.2; share decentralized is between
0.2 and 0.8; share decentralized is above 0.8. Using the zero-share decentralization subset as our base
category, we ﬁnd that the value-decentralization relationship is driven mostly by ﬁrms where at least 20%
of their patents are decentralized. The coeﬃcient on dummy for zero to 0.2 decentralization share is not
statistically signiﬁcant (a coeﬃcient of 0.110 and a standard error 0.068). The coeﬃcient on dummy for
decentralization share higher than 0.8 is 0.173 (a standard error of 0.063), while the coeﬃcient estimate
for 0.2-0.8 decentralization range is 0.256 (a standard error of 0.068).
26organizational form universally dominates the other. They are, however, consistent with
the speciﬁc prediction that the marginal decentralized project creates value whereas the
marginal centralized project merely covers its cost (and perhaps destroys value insofar as
it reﬂects the scientiﬁc interests of the ﬁrm’s researchers rather than the economic interests
of the ﬁrm). As a comparison between Columns 1, 2 and 3 shows, these results are not
sensitive to whether we include both measures of decentralization (assignment and lab
generated patents) or each measure individually. Similarly, these results are not sensitive
to controlling for the location of the ﬁrm’s R&D activities, as was also the case for R&D
and patenting. However, Column 4 shows that, unlike the case for R&D and patenting,
patents acquired through M&A are part of the reason that patents assigned to aﬃliates
are associated with higher market values. This suggests decentralization may have other
beneﬁts, such as the ability to access external R&D.
Recall that we had interpreted the share of patents assigned to aﬃliates as mea-
suring who pays for the R&D project and the share of lab generated patents as measuring
who performed the research. Thus, we interpret a corporate lab generated patent is as-
signed to an aﬃliate as reﬂecting the situation where the R&D project is funded (and
likely also chosen) by an aﬃliate but executed by a central R&D lab. This “hybrid” orga-
nization of R&D could be expected to ameliorate the lack of coordination and neglect of
spillovers characteristic of decentralized R&D, while not losing the connection to business
needs that may aﬄict centralized R&D. Column 8 reports the results of a speciﬁcation
where we divide lab generated patents into those that are assigned to aﬃliates and those
that are centrally assigned. Whereas centrally assigned patents generated from labs have
an e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient of -0.09 (with a standard error of 0.04), lab generated patents that
are assigned to aﬃliates have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. To explore
this distinction further, we split the sample into ﬁrms with at least one corporate R&D
lab and those without. Comparing Columns 6 and 7, we see that assignment to aﬃliates
is more strongly associated with value in ﬁrms with a corporate R&D lab than in ﬁrms
without a lab. The coeﬃcient on assigned patents is nearly 0.4, more than three times
in size for ﬁr m sw i t hac o r p o r a t eR & Dl a bt h a nf o rﬁrms without such labs. Columns 9
and 10 show similar results when estimating Tobin’s Q speciﬁcation, namely that assign-
ment to aﬃliates is positively associated with market value, especially for lab generated
27patents.11
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5.3.2 Sales growth
W ep r o c e e dt oe x p l o r et h ei m p a c to fd e c e n t r a l i z a t i o no fR & Do nﬁrm sales growth. Though
we had not formulated an explicit hypothesis on sales growth, the discussion had strongly
suggested that decentralization should be associated with higher sales growth for two rea-
sons. First, decentralized R&D would support existing products and services, improving
sales. Second, unit managers enjoying greater focus by autonomy (including autonomy on
R&D and IP management) would be able to engage in “division building” for instance by
rejecting licensing opportunities that would create value for the company but hurt their
own sales. More generally, such managers would be able to restrict R&D projects that
threaten to cannibalize sales of their existing products, a strategy that might be harmful
in the long run (a conjecture not supported by the foregoing R&D regressions), but would
certainly produce higher sales growth. in the short run.
Table 7 reports the estimation results. In all speciﬁcations, we report standard errors
robust to arbitrary heteroscadisticity and clustered at the ﬁrm level to allow for correlation
in errors within a ﬁrm. As well, we control for size (assets and sales), R&D stock, and
the stock of patents (all lagged), and industry (4 digit SIC) and year eﬀects Columns 1
examines the decentralization-growth relationship. Consistent with our ﬁndings for market
value, the coeﬃcient on share decentralized is positive and is highly signiﬁcant (0.037 and
a standard error of 0.010).), implying that. increasing the share from zero to the mean
value would be associated with an increase in growth by about 1 percentage point. In
11We check the robustness of our ﬁndings to changes in patent assignment over time. We determine
whether a patent is assigned to an aﬃliates or headquarters by examining the assignee name that appears
on the patent document when it was granted. However, assignees can change over the patent life-cycle.
Reasons for reassigning a patent include a merger or an acquisition, or a managerial decision within-ﬁrms
of how to allocate IP assets across the organization units. Using data on reassignments, as coded by the
USPTO, we test the robustness of our key results. 41,244 patents in our sample are reassigned. Close
to 90% of these reassignments are assigning a patent from headquarters to an aﬃliate (36,180 patents).
There is no big diﬀerence in the share of reassigned patents between M&A and internal patents. For
M&A patents, 8% are reassigned (8,410 patents), where for internal patents, 7% are reassigned (32,834
patents). For M&A-related reassignments, 23% are reassignments from aﬃliates to headquarters, where
for internal patents, about 91% of reassignments are from headquarters to aﬃliates.
We repeat our estimations by accounting for changes in reassignments. The same pattern of results
continue to hold, with no signiﬁcant change in the main coeﬃcient estimates.
28column 2 we include controls for share of central lab-originated patents and a dummy
for whether the ﬁrm had at least one central lab. The coeﬃcient on share of assigned
patents is identical after adding these controls. Whereas the existence of a corporate
lab is associated with higher growth, , the share of lab generated patents has a negative
coeﬃcient, about a third in size of the coeﬃcient of aﬃliate-assigned patents.,. As with
market value and diﬀerent from R&D and patenting, patents acquired through M&A are
positively associated with ﬁrm growth (Column 3). Introducing the controls for inventor
location (Column 4) reduces the coeﬃcient on the share of lab patents from -.013 (1%
signiﬁcance) to -.006 with no statistical signiﬁcance. Possibly, this is because our control
for location is the share of the ﬁrm’s patent in each MSA, which may be highly correlated
with the share of the ﬁrm’s patents produced by its corporate R&D labs.
Comparing Columns 5 and 6, we see that assignment to aﬃliates has a much stronger
association with sales growth in ﬁrms that have corporate R&D labs compared to ﬁrms
that do not have such labs. Taken in conjunction with the positive association between
sales growth and the existence of such labs, we conclude, similar to the discussion with
market value, that this hybrid form seems to provide a useful via media between the two
extreme organizational forms of pure centralization and pure decentralization.
Insert Table 7 here
6 Conclusion and suggestions for future research
This paper develops a new way of using patent data to measure the organization of R&D
within ﬁrms, and explores the relationship between ﬁrm organization and the extent and
nature of research activity, as well its association with performance as measured in sales
growth and market value.
We use data 1,290 American publicly-listed corporations, with 2,615 Patent-receiving
aﬃliates, as well as characteristics of 594,903 patents that belong to these corporations.
One of our key measure is whether a patent is assigned to the parent corporation or to
an aﬃliate. The assignment of intellectual property to a wholly owned aﬃliate cannot
have legal signiﬁcance. However, it likely reﬂects a de facto delegation of authority to the
aﬃliate in how the R&D is managed, a suggestion which is supported by our interviews
29with managers. This interpretation is also consistent with the very high share of patents
generated by corporate R&D labs, typically part of the central R&D organization in large
ﬁrms, assigned to the parent ﬁrm rather than to aﬃliates.
We ﬁnd that patents assigned to aﬃliates are less likely to cite scientiﬁc papers, less
general in scope, and receive fewer citations, especially when these patents are not gener-
ated in corporate R&D labs. Firms that extensively decentralize patents are more likely
to rely upon mergers and acquisitions to acquire patents, and likely to be more diversiﬁed.
We next turn to the relationship between decentralization and outcomes. We ﬁnd that
ﬁrms that decentralize R&D invest less in R&D, and given their R&D investment, produce
fewer patents. The may reﬂect the eﬃcacy of decentralized R&D, or the more incremental
nature of decentralized R&D, or merely diﬀerence in incentives to patent. However, de-
spite being associated with lower investments in R&D and patents, decentralized R&D is
associated with higher market value and sales growth, suggesting that whereas centralized
research may be technically and scientiﬁcally superior, the private economic beneﬁts are
less clear cut.
Given that the nature of research and the choice of organizational forms are jointly
determined, and related to unobserved factors such as technological opportunities, one
cannot infer causal impacts of organizational form on performance. For instance, the data
strongly suggest that the existence of a corporate R&D lab is associated with higher R&D
and patenting, but also with higher market value and sales growth.
Nonetheless, the results are informative about the factors that condition the organi-
zation of R&D. Our ﬁndings are consistent with a view that decentralized R&D, though
more attentive to the immediate needs of the business, is also less likely to result in fun-
damental advances in technology. Conversely, centralized R&D, though perhaps better
for managing pioneering research that draws upon scientiﬁc advances, is susceptible to
wasteful expenditures on scientiﬁcally interesting projects with limited value for the ﬁrm.
Consistent with this, our ﬁndings also suggest that hybrid organizations, where R&D is
performed centrally but the projects are those that the individual units and aﬃliates are
willing to pay for, may be a useful compromise between the two pure forms. Over and
above these ﬁndings, this project contributes by revealing a new way of using patent data
to proxy for diﬀerences in organizational structure.
Future research should focus on teasing out some of the speciﬁc mechanisms through
30which the diﬀerent relationships documented in this paper operate. We outline some po-
tentially promising starting points. First, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between ﬁrm’s
market value and centralization. One mechanism that can drive this relationship is cap-
ture by corporate scientists, who may value “pro-publication” incentives (Merton, 1973).
As Cockburn, Henderson & Stern have argued, these scientists may derive pecuniary ben-
eﬁts(e.g. promotion)and non-pecuniary beneﬁts (e.g. reputation) form increasing their
public rank within their peer hierarchy. This may skew the focus of their R&D activities
towards increasing these private beneﬁts, possibly at the expense of enhancing shareholder
value. Interestingly, Cockburn, et.al. suggest that this mechanism may be potentially ben-
eﬁcial to the ﬁrm, given that these costly pro-publication organizational arrangements may
be seen as the “ticket of admission” which increases ﬁrms absorptive capacity (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990), and thus “pays itself oﬀ in terms of higher R&D productivity.” Our
data suggest that on average this is an investment that may not pay oﬀ,o rm a ye x h i b i t
diminishing returns. Future empirical work should test this mechanism more directly,
for example, by incorporating ﬁrm publications data and conﬁrming whether corpora-
tions that publish more of their research output in leading academic journals are indeed
more likely to be centralized, and capture on average lower market returns on their R&D
investments.
Second, if decentralization adds value by allowing divisions to better exploit local in-
formation (Jensen and Meckling, 1992), and minimize delay that is associated with trans-
mission of information to corporate headquarters (Radner, 1993); (Van Zandt 1999), we
would expect this beneﬁt to be especially strong in higher-velocity environments (Bour-
geois & Eisenhardt, 1988)such as more dynamic and complex industries, and less valuable
in static and discrete ones, where presumably responding fast to new information plays a
less important rule. Here, the variation between industries, as well as ﬁrm’s responses to
sharp and discontinuous environmental changes could be exploited to assess the relative
value of decentralization. Closely related to this is the dimension of local information
which stems from geography. One may expect ﬁrms to vary in the extent to which local
information is geographically dispersed. If decentralized ﬁrms are less geographically con-
centrated, one could test whether the value-decentralization relationship is stronger for
ﬁrms that operate in more geographically dispersed markets.
A separate mechanism is the management of mergers and acquisitions (e.g. target
31selection and post-merger integration). A substantial variation in our data is the extent
to which acquired new ﬁrms are kept independent, rather than being subsumed and inte-
grated into the parent organization. The patterns of assignment of patents to and from
headquarters following acquisitions suggests that deliberate decisions drive this allocation
of rights, and future works should look more closely at the decision of ﬁrms to keep ac-
quired aﬃliates independent. The mechanisms mentioned above should play an important
part in this analysis. For example, scientist-intensive companies may be biased towards
full integration. Similarly, they may beneﬁtf r o ma c q u i r i n gﬁrms with more “basic” tech-
nologies that are further away from commercialization. Along these lines, an interesting
interpretation of the patterns we ﬁnd in this paper is that some ﬁrms may favor structures
which reduce the transaction costs associated with the buying and selling other ﬁrms.
That is, headquarters may develop capabilities in acquiring businesses where part of the
value may come from an eventual disposition. To the extent that the typical goal is to ul-
timately sell the units they invest in, these ﬁrms may face a trade-oﬀ between maximizing
synergies and spillovers during the hold period, versus increasing ﬂexibility to divest later.
Future research should investigate the extent to which a decentralized structure allows
ﬁrms to more easily and eﬀectively divest divisions. The intuition here is that keeping IP
from commingling with headquarters by maintain the assigning of patents to units may
make future divestitures more eﬃcient. This may make the unit’s IP assets more clearly
deﬁned, so that they do not have to be negotiated over during a sale transaction.
A separate issue that we have not explored, but can be potentially important, is the
notion that assignment of intellectual property rights to aﬃliates has a causal eﬀect on
performance. The are several reasons to suspect the presence of this causal eﬀect. Con-
sistent with the property rights theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman & O. D. Hart, 1986; O.
Hart & Moore, 1990), assigning ownership rights may have a real and substantial eﬀect of
incentives, and thus behavior in both ex-ante R&D investment decisions, and ex-post com-
mercialization strategies. While assignment of IP within the organization does not have a
clear legal interpretation, it may still aﬀect incentives through more subtle mechanisms,
such as pride of ownership (Estrin, Jones, & Svejnar, 1987) and relational contracting
(Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002). Moreover, assigning IP to aﬃliates may be impor-
tant from a contracting standpoint. Divisions, unlike aﬃliates, cannot independently
contract with outsiders. IP assignment to aﬃliates may reduce the cost of technology
32transactions by allowing outsiders to directly interact with the relevant unit, rather with
the entire corporation headquarters. Testing the causal eﬀect of assignment is indeed a
substantial challenge. A stating point could be to distinguish between specialized and
diversiﬁed corporations. Presumably, specialized corporations are associated with greater
intra-organization transactions between units and more frequent reallocation of resources.
We would expect that in these organizations the incentives beneﬁts associated with assign-
ment would play a more important role than in diversiﬁed organizations where boundaries
between the IP of diﬀerent units in the organizations are more clearly deﬁned. Additional
tests could look at industry proﬁtability shocks as exogenous triggers to resources reallo-
cation. The assignment hypothesis would then predict that units that own the IP they
generate would be less sensitive to shocks aﬀecting the organization as a whole, than units
where IP is controlled by headquarters.
We hope that future research could shed light on these central mechanisms.
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41AA p p e n d i x
This section details the construction of the data platform used in this project. The central
datasets consist of a patent-level panel and a ﬁrm-level panel, which are linked via the
unique patent id numbers. Each of these panels is built up iteratively, by incorporating
data from the following sources: (i) patent level information from the United States Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO), (ii) ownership structure data from Icarus and Amadeus
by Bureau Van Dyke (BVD), (iii) Merger and acquisition data from Thomson Reuters
SDC Platinum and Zephyr by Bureau Van Dyke, (iv) accounting information from U.S.
Compustat, and (v) extensive manual searches of on-line resources, such as corporate and
governments websites, and search engines.
A.1 Ownership Structure
Assignee information is available from the USPTO, but many of the patent assignments
are made to aﬃliate ﬁrms. Furthermore, ﬁrms vary in their choice to utilize aﬃliates
for their assignments, resulting in noisy (at best) or biased (likely) patent and citation
counts at the ﬁrm level. The linchpin of this project is the identiﬁcation of an ultimate
owner (“UO”) for a large portion of the companies reported as patent assignees by the
USPTO. Here we follow the methodology employed by Belenzon and Berkowitz (2010).
We obtain ownership structure data from the Icarus and Amadeus databases by Bureau
Van Dyke (BVD). The Amadeus ownership database includes detailed information of
the percentage of ownership between shareholders and their subsidiaries. We develop an
ownership algorithm that constructs the internal structure parent and aﬃliate groupings
based on their inter-company ownership links.
The algorithm follows three steps: (i) completes missing ownership links, (ii) generates
lists of all subsidiaries and parents for each company, and (iii) constructs the ownership
chains bottom-up. To illustrate our methodology, it would be useful to consider the
following example. Suppose Figure A.1 correctly describes the ownership structure of a
conglomerate. The ultimate owner ﬁrm at the apex of the group controls 7 public and
private ﬁrms. Amadeus provides detailed data on direct ownership links. Thus, our raw
data include the links  → ,  → ,  → ,a n d → . Note that the percentage of
ownership for the link  →  has to be larger than 20 (because ﬁrm  is public), where for
the percentage of ownership for all other links has to be larger than 50 (because the other
subsidiaries are private). Because there is no information about indirect ownership links,
the link  →  is missing from the raw data. The ﬁrst step of the algorithm is to complete
missing links. As we observe the ownership relations  →  and  → ,o u ra l g o r i t h m
infers the ownership relation  →  . N o t et h a ta tt h i ss t a g eo ft h ea l g o r i t h mw es t i l l
do not know whether the ownership relation is direct or indirect (and if it is indirect,
how many layers separate ﬁrm  from ﬁrm ). The second step of the algorithm is to
construct two lists for each ﬁrm: shareholders and subsidiaries. This step saves valuable
running time, which is especially important when dealing with large scale ownership data.
The following table is generated:
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 ,  -
  -
  -
Note that from step 1, we already know that ﬁrm  is a shareholder of ﬁrm .T h e
third and ﬁnal step of the algorithm is to construct the structure of the group based on
the above ownership relations. Because of the missing links problem, our algorithm does
not assume that an ownership relation is direct; the only input the algorithm receives is
the existence of the ownership relation. We start with a ﬁrm that has no subsidiaries
from the list generated in step 2. We illustrate the procedure for ﬁrm ,w h i c hi st h e
most interesting in this example. Firm  is placed at the bottom of the ownership chain.
N e x t ,w em o v et ot h es h a r e h o l d e rl i s to fﬁrm .I t i n c l u d e s ﬁrms  and .S t a r t i n g
arbitrary with ,p l a c e above . Proceeding to ﬁrm , there are three possibilities
for its location: (i)  is above  and above ; (ii)  is above ,b u tb e l o w; (iii) 
is above , but not below neither above  (diﬀerent ownership chain). For (i) to be the
right structure,  has to appear in the shareholder list of ﬁrm .F r o m s t e p 2 ,w e r u l e
this out. For (ii) to be the right structure,  has to appear on the subsidiary list of ﬁrm
. From step 2, we rule this out. For (ii) to be the right structure, D has to appear on the
subsidiary list of ﬁrm A. From step 2, this holds. Finally, for (iii) to be the right structure,
A cannot appear on either the shareholder or subsidiary lists of ﬁrm D. From step 2, this
is ruled out. At the end of this procedure, we have determined for each ownership chain
the highest shareholder ﬁrm - we call this ﬁrm the leading shareholder.
A.1.1 Dealing with M&A
A central issue in our analysis is the post-merger management of acquired ﬁrms. The
decentralization variation in our data comes mostly from two sources: the degree of post-
acquisition integration of aﬃliates (with a lower bound being those kept independent), and
the speed at which patents are generated centrally in relation to existing aﬃliates. For each
acquired ﬁrm we determine whether it remained independent post-acquisition, or whether
it was dissolved. We take several steps in determining whether a ﬁrm is independent. First,
we check whether the ﬁrm appears in Amadeus or Icarus as an independent company.
Second, we manually check ea c hc o m p a n yl i s t e di nt h eﬁrst step whether it continues to
operate independently from the parent company. We check their corporate websites to
conﬁrm that their legal disclaimers and investor relations information references a parent
company.
Dissolved acquisitions are much more problematic. Because we match patents to ﬁrms
based on the 2008 ownership structure, we lose historical acquisitions that were fully
integrated in the parent company and ceased to exist as separate legal entities. Though
we do capture post-acquisition patents as those are likely to be assigned to headquarters,
we may nonetheless over measure decentralization (because all historical patents that we
43do not match are centralized). To mitigate this problem we take two steps. We match all
ﬁrms in SDC Platinum where the acquiring ﬁrm appears in our sample. We then add to
our data all patents that belong to acquired ﬁrms that no longer appear in the 2008 data.
SDC platinum is likely to miss smaller acquisitions, so we also did an extensive search
of public sources (such as Lexis-Nexis,EDGAR and general web searches) to generate a
list of all acquisitions for the top 500 patenting corporations in our sample. As this is an
iterative process, the resolution of M&A issues was not completed until the ﬁnal stages
of all our patent and ﬁrm matching (i.e. this last step would have been taken after the
completion of A.2.1 below). For acquisitions that do not appear in SDC we classify its
patents as follows: if the ﬁrm is active in 2008 (thus, it is matched to one of the ﬁrms in
our ﬁrm universe) then we classify it as an aﬃliate of the acquiring corporation. However,
in case there is no match between this ﬁrm and our ﬁrm universe, we classify all of its
patents to the acquiring ﬁrm headquarters.
Overall, we matched 50,931 patents to SDC and Zephyr. An underlying assumption
of this matching is that an aﬃliate exists in 2008. If the aﬃliate was historically dissolved
it will not appear in our ﬁrm universe, hence, its patents will not be included in our
sample. In order to overcome this problem, we take two steps. First, for the largest 500
patenting corporations in our sample we manually collect data, from public sources, on
their historical acquisitions. This list allows us to identify those ﬁrms that were acquired
and fully dissolved. Second, we generate a list of the top 1,000 American assignees (as
indicated by the address of the assignee) that were not matched to our data. The remaining
unmatched ﬁr m sh a v el e s st h a n4 0p a t e n t so v e rt h e i rl i f e t i m e ,s oi ti sr e a s o n a b l et oa s s u m e
that they are not patent-intensive ﬁrms. For each unmatched ﬁrm remaining in our sample,
we manually investigate whether it was acquired by any of our sample parent corporations,
or by any ﬁrms that themselves were acquired by our parent corporations. These two steps
lead us to identify 53,761 patents, which we proceed to classify as centrally assigned. In
total, we identify 104,692 as being acquired through a merger or an acquisition. Of these
patents, 55,702 (53%) are assigned to aﬃliates, and the remaining patents are assigned to
headquarters.
For each acquired ﬁrm we determine whether it remained operational post-acquisition.
We take several steps in determining whether a ﬁrm is independent. First, we check
whether the ﬁrm appears in Amadeus or Icarus as an independent company. Second,
we manually check each company listed in the ﬁrst step whether it continues to operate
independently from the parent company. We check their corporate websites to conﬁrm
that their legal disclaimers and investor relations information references a parent company.
Dissolved acquisitions are much more problematic. Because we match patents to ﬁrms
based on the 2008 ownership structure, we lose historical acquisitions that were fully
integrated in the parent company and ceased to exist as separate legal entities. Though
we do capture post-acquisition patents as those are likely to be assigned to headquarters,
we may nonetheless over measure decentralization (because all historical patents that we
do not match are centralized). To mitigate this problem we performed an exhaustive
manual search to identify a signiﬁcant majority of these absorbed ﬁrms and match them
to their patents. Appendix A.1.3 for a description of this process.
44A.2 Matching patent data
We standardize a name cleaning algorithm that is run both on the UO dataset and the 2007
NBER Patent and Citations Dataset in order to match observations by company name.
We utilize the assignee codes contained in NBPATS only as quality checks, or for guidance
in manual searches, however we concentrate on matches using the aﬃliate company names
and our ultimate owner company names from UO. The algorithm utilizes both automated
rules and manual inputs to reduce most ﬁr mn a m e st oao n eo rt w ow o r ds t r i n gv a r i a b l e .
Extensive testing was performed to yield the highest rates of matching, while minimizing
multiplicity errors (which occur when two distinct names are rendered equal by deleting
distinguishing words). Like previous work in name matching, we capitalize all letters, and
remove extraneous characters and strings such as “&,” “THE,” “ASSOCIATES,” etc. We
compile a list of 175 most common such “junk” words (i.e. non-essential for uniquely
identifying companies). Our list is more targeted to American ﬁrms (our focus) than
those lists developed by the NBER Patent Data Project. Furthermore, one reﬁnement
over previous such name matching projects is our use of a process whereby junk words
are truncated in a right-to-left fashion. This increases the match yield signiﬁcantly, as
w ea r ea b l et or e m o v e ,f o re x a m p l e ,t h ew o r d“ I N T E R N A T I O N A L ”f r o m“ P I O N E E RH I -
BRED INTERNATIONAL, INC,” (because it occurs on the right side) while allowing it to
remain in “INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION.” To illustrate,
the truncation would proceed as follows:
1. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.
2. PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INC. (capitalize)
3. PIONEER HI BRED INTERNATIONAL INC (remove punctuation)
4. PIONEER HI BRED INTERNATIONAL (remove last word if “junk”)
5. PIONEER HI BRED (remove last word if “junk.” Stop)
Here, the algorithm stops when it reaches a “non-junk” word. For “INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION,” it would have stopped after truncating the
word “CORPORATION.”
We can further see the power of this “right-to-left”approach by looking at the way
that the sub string “HI” above is treated under a diﬀerent set of conditions. Consider the
name “VERIZON INC/HI” (it is common in Compustat to include state identiﬁers):
1. Verizon Inc./HI
2. VERIZON INC./HI (capitalize)
3. VERIZON INC HI (remove punctuation)
4. VERIZON INC (remove last word if “junk.”)
5. VERIZON (remove last word if “junk.” Stop)
Here, the sub string “HI” is properly removed, whereas removing it from Pioneer Hi-
B r e dw o u l dh a v er e s u l t e di nac o r r u p t i o no ft h ei d e n t i ﬁer.
One of the tradeoﬀs in matching is always between high yield and multiplicity errors.
For example, one can see how too aggressive an algorithm can render “American Express,”
“American Airlines,” and “American Standard” into “AMERICAN.” Our choice was to
err on the side of higher multiplicity, but to rely on manual checks to correct any mis-
coded companies. By always keeping track of the original, uncleaned names, we added
extra steps to check any duplicates (i.e. cases where the same cleaned name corresponded
to more than one original name). At this stage, extensive manual eﬀort was expended
45to resolve ambiguities by performing actual checks of patent images and web searches.
Ultimately, we match over 846,000 patents to our UO ﬁle.
A . 2 . 1 M a t c h i n gt oC o m p u s t a t
Having matched patents to ﬁrms to ultimate owners, we proceed to match as many ulti-
mate owners as possible to a CUSIP (in order to tap into Compustat accounting informa-
tion). Because only publicly traded companies are listed by Compustat, this eﬀectively
s e r v e sa saﬁlter to eliminate government and institutional entities that may have mis-
takenly made it into our sample by this point. We utilize the standardized matching
a l g o r i t h mu s e di nA . 2 . 1 ,w i t hs o m em o d i ﬁcations to account for idiosyncratic Compustat
“junk words.”
A.2.2 Corporate R&D labs
An important measure in our analysis is whether a patent is generated at a corporate lab or
not. For our purposes, this is a binary outcome, as we are not interested in distance (once
a patent is not lab-generated, we do not care how far from headquarters it came from, just
as we do not care how far away the lab was from headquarters). We identify the research
facilities for the majority of our sample by utilizing the Directory of American Research
and Technology, which lists such facilities for all publicly traded companies in America
that are considered research-oriented. This gives us the city and zip code information for
each ﬁrm’s R&D lab facility. Because the directory does not capture every ﬁrm in our
sample, we compliment this with a manual search that spanned 987 ﬁrms. Using publicly
available sources such as corporate websties and ﬁnancial ﬁlings, we identify the location
for these ﬁrm’s labs.
Next, we obtain inventor information for all patents from the USPTO database, which
is given in string format that provides city or town name and state, for example "Joliet,
IL." The ﬁrst step is to match inventor location to a database of zip codes by utilizing a
commercial zip code database obtained from www.zip-codes.com. This entailed signiﬁcant
automated and manual matching due to very diﬀerent naming conventions utilized by the
two data sources. For example, the USPTO city name ﬁeld contains numerous noise terms
such as "Late of" or "Both of," as well as variations of names, such as the following for













46St. Paul ,all of
St. Paul, all of MN
St. Paul, both of MN
St. Paul, of all
St. Paul.
Once we had zip codes for every inventor for every patent, and every corporate lab for
every ﬁrm, we proceeded to match them by CBSA code. One limitation faced by many
studies that utilize location as a measure concerns the multiple towns, cities, and zip codes
are often within the same metropolitan region. Thus, relying solely on Zip code or city
name, one would miss that Boston and Cambridge facilities may in fact be within the
same R&D complex. This is even more problematic when we match to inventors, since
inventors.addresses are more prone to variation within the area around an R&D lab (as
they live in suburbs, etc.). To counter this, we matched our inventor and lab data data to
the US Oﬃce of Management and Budget’s Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSA areas),
which is accessible at www.census.gov/population/www/metroareas. This database gives
us the CBSA code associated with each Zip Codes.
After identifying the CBSA code for each inventor and each lab, we identify every
patent in our sample where at least one inventor is located in the same CBSA as a lab (at
the ﬁrm level). Thus, this patent-level indicator variable lab_match takes on the value
of one for patents where we assume that the inventor was aﬃliated with one of the ﬁrm’s
R&D labs. Our assumption is that if the patent came from an inventor located in close
proximity to a corporate lab, is very likely that she would have been involved with the lab
in generating that invention.
A.2.3 Dealing with M&A
A central issue in our analysis is the post-merger management of acquired ﬁrms. The
decentralization variation in our data comes mostly from two sources: the degree of post-
acquisition integration of aﬃliates (with a lower bound being those kept independent), and
the speed at which patents are generated centrally in relation to existing aﬃliates. For each
acquired ﬁrm we determine whether it remained independent post-acquisition, or whether
it was dissolved. We take several steps in determining whether a ﬁrm is independent. First,
we check whether the ﬁrm appears in Amadeus or Icarus as an independent company.
Second, we manually check ea c hc o m p a n yl i s t e di nt h eﬁrst step whether it continues to
operate independently from the parent company. We check their corporate websites to
conﬁrm that their legal disclaimers and investor relations information references a parent
company.
Dissolved acquisitions are much more problematic. Because we match patents to ﬁrms
based on the 2008 ownership structure, we lose historical acquisitions that were fully
integrated in the parent company and ceased to exist as separate legal entities. Though
we do capture post-acquisition patents as those are likely to be assigned to headquarters,
we may nonetheless over measure decentralization (because all historical patents that we
do not match are centralized). To mitigate this problem we take two steps. We match all
ﬁrms in SDC Platinum where the acquiring ﬁrm appears in our sample. We then add to
our data all patents that belong to acquired ﬁrms that no longer appear in the 2008 data.
SDC platinum is likely to miss smaller acquisitions, so we also did an extensive search
47of public sources (such as Lexis-Nexis,EDGAR and general web searches) to generate a
list of all acquisitions for the top 500 patenting corporations in our sample. As this is an
iterative process, the resolution of M&A issues was not completed until the ﬁnal stages
of all our patent and ﬁrm matching (i.e. this last step would have been taken after the
completion of A.2.1 below). For acquisitions that do not appear in SDC we classify its
patents as follows: if the ﬁrm is active in 2008 (thus, it is matched to one of the ﬁrms in
our ﬁrm universe) then we classify it as an aﬃliate of the acquiring corporation. However,
in case there is no match between this ﬁrm and our ﬁrm universe, we classify all of its
patents to the acquiring ﬁrm headquarters.
Overall, we matched 50,931 patents to SDC and Zephyr. An underlying assumption
of this matching is that an aﬃliate exists in 2008. If the aﬃliate was historically dissolved
it will not appear in our ﬁrm universe, hence, its patents will not be included in our
sample. In order to overcome this problem, we take two steps. First, for the largest 500
patenting corporations in our sample we manually collect data, from public sources, on
their historical acquisitions. This list allows us to identify those ﬁrms that were acquired
and fully dissolved. Second, we generate a list of the top 1,000 American assignees (as
indicated by the address of the assignee) that were not matched to our data. The remaining
unmatched ﬁr m sh a v el e s st h a n4 0p a t e n t so v e rt h e i rl i f e t i m e ,s oi ti sr e a s o n a b l et oa s s u m e
that they are not patent-intensive ﬁrms. For each unmatched ﬁrm remaining in our sample,
we manually investigate whether it was acquired by any of our sample parent corporations,
or by any ﬁrms that themselves were acquired by our parent corporations. These two steps
lead us to identify 53,761 patents, which we proceed to classify as centrally assigned. In
total, we identify 104,692 as being acquired through a merger or an acquisition. Of these
patents, 55,702 (53%) are assigned to aﬃliates, and the remaining patents are assigned to
headquarters.
A.3 Reassignments
Our measures of assignment structure builds on the assignee name that appears on the
patent document when it was granted. Patent assignment can change over time. To test
the robustness of our results to changes in assignment, we develop comprehensive data
on patent reassignment. Reassignment data are taken directly from the USPTO website
(using a specialized "spider" program), and then merged to our ﬁnal patent sample. We are
interested in two reassignment types: (i) assigning a patent that was originally assigned
to headquarters to an aﬃliates, and (ii) reassigning to headquarters a patent that was
originally assigned to an aﬃliate.1213 To determine reassignment type we match old and
new assignees to our ﬁrm name sample. Some patents undergo reassignments over their
lifetime for reasons that are not germane to our study. For example, patents are very often
reassigned to correct errors in the initial document, or for purposes of collateralization for
12For example, we ﬁnd evidence of the ﬁrst type of reassignment in many patents held by Boston
Scientiﬁc ,w h i c hw e r ea s s i g n e dt oa ﬃliates such as Advanced Bionics and Sci Med Life Systems years after
Boston Scientiﬁc bought them. As well, we see patents going from acquired aﬃliate to headquarters, for
example Matrix Semiconductor assigning 157 of its 421 patents to parent company Sandisk.
13A third type of reassignment is inter-ﬁrm. Because the current paper deals with intra-ﬁrm allocation
of IP rights, we exclude inter-ﬁrm reassignment from our sample.
48lenders (which results in multiple reassignments, as when the status of the loan changes).
Ultimately, 41,244 patents in our sample are meaningfully reassigned. Close to 90(36,180
patents), supporting our view of assignments as being associated with a long-term eﬀective
delegation of authority. Furthermore, although not discussed in detail in the text, our
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Share asssigned patents  t-1 16,104 0.33 0.42 0 0.03 1
Share lab patents t-1 16,104 0.27 0.67 0 0 1
Market Value ($mm) 16,104 1,430 7,104 4 126 2,936
Tobin's Q 16,104 1.15 2.13 0.14 0.58 2.34
Sales Growth 16,031 0.105 0.358 -0.012 0.084 0.360
Sales t-1 ($mm) 14,562 3,616 11,964 34 596 8,227
Assets t-1 ($mm) 16,104 2,091 7,272 11 197 4,725
R&D Expenditures ($mm) 16,104 109 472 0 5.3 183
R&D Stock t-1 ($mm) 16,104 452 1,819 0 22 814
Patents Stock t-1 16,104 153 611 0.6 14 266
Patents flow, count 16,104 25 99 0 2 48
Patents flow, weighed by cites 16,104 20 88 0 1 31
Dummy for Decentralized 595,710 0.18 0.39 0 0 1
Dummy for lab generated 595,710 0.34 0.47 0 0 1
Generality 404,632 0.57 0.32 0 0.66 1
Originality 433,449 0.27 0.28 0 0.22 0.67
Citations per Patent 595,710 8.90 15.90 0 4 22
Citations per Patent (>0) 430,237 11.30 17.10 1 6 26
Citations to Non-Patent Lit. 595,710 0.78 3.89 0 0 2
Citations to Non-Patent Lit. (>0) 106,578 4.30 8.30 1 2 9
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Distribution
Panel A: Firms (Firm-Year)
Panel B: Patents
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for key variables used in the econometric analysis. Market Value includes 
common stock, preferred stock and debt, net of current assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio between Market Value and Assets. 
R&D Stock is computed using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 15%. Patents Stock is 
citations-weighted and is computed using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 15%. Share 
assigned patents divides a firm's total number of affiliate-assigned patents by its total number of patents. Generality is 
the HHI measure of concentration of the citations a patent receives across three-digit U.S. class. Originality is the HHI 
measure of concentration of the citations a patent makes across three-digit U.S. class. Citations to Non-Patent Lit. is the 
number of citations a patent makes to non-patent literature.Variable Obs.
Affiliate minus 
HQ assigned  Obs.
Affiliate minus 
HQ assigned  Obs.
Affiliate minus 
HQ assigned 
Number of citations 595,710 -0.414** 394,389 -0.491** 201,321 -0.225**
Number of citations (>0) 430,237 -0.557** 281,387 -0.869** 148,850 0.101
Citations to Non-Patent Lit. 595,710 -0.226** 394,389 -0.283** 201,321 -0.132
Citations to Non-Patent Lit. (>0) 106,578 -0.366** 73,171 -0.464** 33,407 -0.198
Generality 404,632 -0.018** 263,085 -0.019** 141,547 -0.015**
Central R&D All Affiliate R&D
Table 2. Patent Characteristics by Assignement and R&D Location
Notes: This table reports mean comparison tests for affiliate assigned and HQ assigned patents by the location of R&D. Share assigned patents divides 
a firm's total number of affiliate-assigned patents by its total number of patents.  ** denotes that the difference in means is significant at the 1 percent 
level. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)











ln(1+Citations Received) -0.016** -0.018** -0.017** -0.013** -0.013** -0.003** -0.025**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0009)
ln(1+Citations to Non-Patent Lit.) -0.016** -0.017** -0.016** -0.017** -0.008** -0.007** -0.020**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Patent Generality -0.018** -0.019** -0.016** -0.018** -0.018** -0.011** -0.201**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Patent Originality -0.010** -0.011** -0.010** -0.003 -0.003 -0.009** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Diversity (HHI) -0.077**
(0.005)
Technology areas dummies:
Biotechnology 0.017** 0.012 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.016** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Chemicals -0.019** -0.018** -0.014** -0.005 -0.006 -0.019** -0.018**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Telecommunications -0.105** -0.096** -0.080** -0.071** -0.072** -0.101** -0.100**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Electronics -0.109** -0.102** -0.095** -0.079** -0.079** -0.081** -0.092**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Semiconductors -0.269** -0.289** -0.240** -0.199** -0.198** -0.251** -0.247**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Information Technology -0.190** -0.185** -0.157** -0.140** -0.141** -0.154** -0.162**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Engineering -0.031** -0.023** -0.041** -0.016** -0.017** -0.030** -0.028**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
% Affiliated 18.4 18.9 18.4 18.4 12.0 14.5 20.4
R
2 0.0379 0.037 0.043 0.111 0.052 0.060 0.052
Observations 594,903 467,246 594,903 594,903 551,237 200,514 394,389
Table 3. Affiliate patent assignment 
Dependent variable: Dummy for affiliate assignment. Probit Estimation (marginal effects)
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of a Probit model that examines the determinants of decentralization. The 
base technology area  is Pharmaceuticals. We assign specific codes, and include respective dummy variables for patents that 
receive (make) less than two citations. For these patents Generality (Originality) is not defined. All columns include an 
unreported Other technology category. Firm Diversity (column 3) is computed as the  HHI measure of concentration of 
firm's patents across two-digit IPC. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for 
serial correlation. **, * denote significance levels of 1 and 5 percent, respectively. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)





Share assigned t-1 -0.303** -0.292** -0.298** -0.337** -0.220** -0.323** -0.317** -0.241**
(0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.056)
Dummy for a lab 0.167** 0.204** 0.210** 0.205** 0.130 0.183** 0.109
(0.069) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.071) (0.070)
Share of lab patents -0.056 -0.045 -0.053 -0.044 -0.046 -0.041
(0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Share M&A patents t-1 0.102
(0.068)
ln(1 + No. Affiliates) 0.025 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.004 -0.004 -0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(Sales)t-1 0.771** 0.760** 0.760** 0.762** 0.759** 0.747** -0.186** -0.196** -0.203**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Four-digit SIC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares of patents by MSA 
(197 region controls)  No No No No Yes Yes No No No
R
2  0.823 0.824 0.825 0.823 0.825 0.858 0.661 0.663 0.726
Observations 11,168 11,168 11,168 11,168 11,168 11,168 11,165 11,165 11,165
ln(R&D)
Table 4. R&D Equation
ln(R&D/Sales)
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of the relation between R&D expenditure and decentralization.  Share 
assigned divides a firm's total number of affiliate-assigned patents by its total number of patents. Dummy for lab receives the 
value of one for corporations that have at least one R&D lab, and zero for corporations that have no recorded R&D labs. 
Shares of patents by MSA is a complete set of share variables of the firm patents distribution across 197 MSA regions. 
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by 








Share assigned t-1 -0.164** -0.154** -0.108* -0.180** -0.154** -0.187** -0.176** -0.122* -0.203**
(0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059)
Dummy for a lab 0.198** 0.196** 0.136* 0.198** 0.209** 0.206** 0.147*
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
Share of lab patents 0.030 0.025 0.050 0.030 0.040 0.035 0.055
(0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035)
Share M&A patents t-1 -0.126 -0.146*
(0.069) (0.069)
ln(1 + No. Affiliates) 0.069** 0.061** 0.066** 0.057** 0.061** 0.067** 0.059** 0.065** 0.053*
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
ln(Sales)t-1 0.145** 0.135** 0.137** 0.136** 0.135** 0.127** 0.116** 0.118** 0.108**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
ln(R&D Stock)t-1 0.360** 0.353** 0.352** 0.329** 0.353** -0.585** -0.592** -0.593** -0.601**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026)
Four-digit SIC 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares of patents by 
MSA (197 region 
controls)  No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R
2  0.652 0.655 0.656 0.697 0.655 0.819 0.821 0.821 0.841
Observations 10,796 10,796 10,796 10,796 10,796 10,796 10,796 10,796 10,796
Table 5. Patents Equation
ln[(1+Patents)/R&D stock]  ln(1+Patents) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of the relation between patenting activity and decentralization. Share 
assigned divides a firm's total number of affiliate-assigned patents by its total number of patents. Dummy for lab 
receives the value of one for corporations that have at least one R&D lab, and zero for corporations that have no 
recorded R&D labs. Shares of patents by MSA is a complete set of share variables of the firm patents distribution across 
197 MSA regions.  In columns 4 and 8 the number of patents are weighed by the number of citations they receive. The 
weight for patent is the ratio between the number of citations it received and the average number of citations received by 
all patents that are granted in the same year as the focal patent. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. **, * denote significance levels of 1 and 5 







Share assigned t-1 0.037** 0.037** 0.022* 0.039** 0.043** 0.024
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
Dummy for a lab 0.019* 0.020* 0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Share lab patents t-1 -0.013** -0.011** -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Share M&A patents t-1 0.044**
(0.011)
ln(R&D Stock)t-1 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
ln(1 + No. Affiliates) 0.018** 0.018** 0.016** 0.020** 0.015** 0.028**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
ln(1+Patents stock)t-1 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.015** -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
ln(Sales)t-1 -0.105** -0.105** -0.107** -0.114** -0.107* -0.124**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.048) (0.024)
ln(Assets)t-1 0.063** 0.064** 0.065** 0.069** 0.060 0.077**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.042) (0.022)
Four-digit SIC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares of patents by MSA (197 
region controls)  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.107 0.108 0.109 0.122 0.140 0.125
Observations 16,031 16,031 16,031 16,031 6,540 9,491
Dependent variable: ∆ln(Sales)t-1
Table 6. Sales Growth Equation
Notes: This table reports results for the OLS estimation of the relation between patent 
decentralization and firm sales growth. Share assigned divides a firm's total number of affiliate-
assigned patents by its total number of patents. Dummy for lab receives the value of one for 
corporations that have at least one R&D lab, and zero for corporations that have no recorded R&D 
labs. Shares of patents by MSA is a complete set of share variables of the firm patents distribution 
across 197 geographic regions.  In columns 4 and 8 the number of patents are weighed by the number 
of citations they receive. The weight for patent is the ratio between the number of citations it received 
and the average number of citations received by all patents that are grated in the same year as the 
focal patent. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for 
serial correlation through clustering by firms. **, * denote significance levels of 1 and 5 percent, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)







Share assigned t-1 0.249** 0.244** 0.164** 0.234** 0.397** 0.121 0.254**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.083) (0.068) (0.050)
Dummy for a lab 0.136** 0.138** 0.142** 0.132* 0.100 0.058 0.016
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064) (0.058) (0.052) (0.053)
Share lab patents t-1 -0.084* -0.090* -0.076* -0.064 -0.099** -0.079** -0.094**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.033) (0.035)
Share M&A patents t-1 0.241**
(0.057)
Share assigned lab patents t-
1 0.246** 0.231**
(0.093) (0.087)
Share assigned non-Lab 
patents t-1 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
ln(1 + No. Affiliates) 0.045** 0.041** 0.047** 0.031 0.057** 0.025 0.044 0.046** -0.003 -0.001
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.027) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
ln(1+Patents stock)t-1 0.051** 0.045** 0.039** 0.045** 0.034* 0.080** 0.017 0.038*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.022) (0.017)
ln(R&D stock)t-1 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.033 0.006 0.044* 0.016
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.035) (0.023) (0.019)
ln(Assets)t-1 0.813** 0.811** 0.813** 0.810** 0.796** 0.799** 0.800** 0.813**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.037) (0.025) (0.020)
(R&D stock/Assets) t-1 0.078** 0.077**
(0.015) (0.015)
(Patents stock/Assets) t-1 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
Four-digit SIC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares of patents by MSA 
(197 region controls)  No No No No Yes No No No No No
R
2 0.816 0.816 0.815 0.817 0.826 0.827 0.817 0.816 0.306 0.302
Observations 16,104 16,104 16,104 16,104 16,104 6,548 9,556 16,104 14,448 14,448
Table 7. Market Value Equation
ln(Market Value) ln(Tobin's Q)
Notes: This table reports OLS estimation results of the effect of patent decentralization on firm market value. The level of analysis is firm-
year. Share assigned divides a firm's total number of affiliate-assigned patents by its total number of patents. Standard errors (in brackets) 
are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. **,  * denote significance levels of 1 
and 5 percent, respectively.